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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to explore the role of instruments in the transformation of institutional logics
and their associated practices at the micro level. Based on an ethnographic study, this article compares two
working groups — one responsible for equity and the other for fixed-income investments — in an asset
management company attempting to integrate new demands for socially responsible investment (SRI).
These two working groups both sought to change their investment processes through the introduction of
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new calculative devices. The equity group was perceived to be more successful than the fixed-income
group in introducing SRI because of its greater ability to fabricate calculative devices capable of mediating
between financial returns and social responsibility. Elaborating on these findings, the article argues that
instruments can effect institutional change when actors come to believe that available instruments are
sufficiently flexible and incomplete to act as “mediating instruments” between practice and institutional
change.

Key words: Equity Investment – Fixed-Income Investment – Institutional Logics – Mediating
Instruments – Socially Responsible Investment
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Introduction

Instruments of accounting matter. Accountants have long been interested in the “interplay between
ways of calculating and ways of managing social and organizational life” (Hopwood & Miller, 1994, p. 1).
The concepts of institutional logics, practices, and instruments are all widely used in accounting. Yet there
has been little research on the mechanisms by which, and the conditions under which, instruments can
mediate the transformation of institutional logics and their associated practices, especially at the micro
level (Cloutier & Langley, 2013; Ezzamel, Robson, & Stapleton, 2012; Jones, Boxenbaum, & Anthony,
2013). This is surprising, especially since accountants are acutely aware of the mediating role of
instruments, such as auditing standards and technology roadmaps, in framing practices in their
institutional environment (e.g., Mennicken, 2008; Miller & O’Leary, 2007). Scholarship on institutional
logics has centered on practice variation as a basis of transformation (Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012;
Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). However, researchers have almost entirely neglected the role of
instruments as a vehicle to enable these practice variations. Part of the problem is that they have not
engaged with developments in accounting theory that have pointed to the role of accounts and accounting
instruments in creating the classificatory and evaluative media through which practice changes are
effected.

This article addresses the role played by instruments such as financial models and financial criteria —
so-called calculative devices (Callon & Muniesa, 2005) — in the transformation of the logic and practices
of the asset management industry, following the emergence of new demands for socially responsible
investment (SRI). For an industry, a logic consists of the “identities and valuation orders that structure the
decision making and the practices of the players in a product market” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 805).
Examining these mechanisms is central to understanding how institutional change is facilitated or
hindered in an environment where calculative devices are so fundamental (MacKenzie, 2011). It is also
necessary in order to understand the decisive role played by accounting in institutional change. Miller and
Power (2013, p. 592) have argued that accounting is a “variable bearer of potential institutional logics
providing the mechanism for their realization and expression at the organizational level.”

The term socially responsible investment refers to the incorporation of non-financial criteria, such as
carbon emissions or human rights indicators, into investment processes, with the aim of generating better
financial performance and restoring a long-term perspective to asset management. SRI involves a
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transformation of the financial logic that underlies the practices of asset management. Based on a threeyear ethnographic study, using participative observation, semi-structured interviews, and documentary
evidence, this article compares how two working groups in an asset management company redesigned
their equity and fixed-income investment processes by transforming their calculative devices to integrate
SRI demands. A central concern is the question of the role of these devices in explaining why SRI was
apparently better integrated in the equity investment processes than in the fixed-income versions. To date,
little research has explicitly examined whether and why demands for SRI shape the practices used for
different types of products within the industry in different ways.

This article explores the role of instruments in the transformation of the institutional logic of the
asset management industry and its associated practices at the micro level. It specifically seeks to identify
the mechanisms through which a change in institutional logic is instituted, and how the logic, practices, and
instruments mobilized by actors within an organization are bound together in a recursive relationship. The
article also analyzes how institutional and practice change are effected through the transformation of
instruments that mediate the relationships between the logic and its associated practices (Kurunmäki &
Miller, 2011; Miller & O’Leary, 2007; Miller & Power, 2013).

The second aim of the current research is to establish the conditions that make the co-transformation
of the logic, practices, and instruments possible. The article shows that actors’ perceptions of a lack of
appropriate instruments may impede institutional change by preventing the available instruments from
serving as mediating instruments, which are instruments that mediate between arenas and actors (Miller &
O’Leary, 2007, p. 702). This article argues that actors’ beliefs in the flexibility and incompleteness of the
instruments in use help explain institutional and practice change by facilitating collective work and the
generation of new knowledge that together enrich previous practices. Within the same industry, different
categories of products are therefore amenable to institutional change to differing extents owing to the
specificity of instruments in use and their associated “clusters of evaluation practices” (MacKenzie, 2011,
p. 1783).

The next section describes the theoretical context, and is followed by sections detailing the research
setting and methods. The study moves on to present the empirical segment that summarizes
developments in the two working groups as they responded to pressures to incorporate SRI. The
following section then analyzes those different developments. The study concludes by reflecting upon the
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implications of the findings for theorizing the role of instruments in the transformation of logics and
practices.

Theoretical background

The role of instruments in mediating practice and institutional change
Accounting scholars have long referenced both practice and institutional theories to study accounting
change. Two decades ago, Hopwood and Miller considered accounting to be a “social and institutional
practice.” (1994). Since then, several researchers have attempted to conceptualize the role of accounting in
mediating the relationships between practice and institutional change (e.g., Abernethy & Chua, 1996;
Burns & Scapens, 2000; Dambrin, Lambert, & Sponem, 2007; Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004;
Hopper & Major, 2007).
Previous research has demonstrated that accounting, institutional, and practice change are mutually
connected through two relationships. First, accounting instruments and practices are influenced by both
institutional and other practice elements. Abernethy and Chua (1996), for instance, argued that both the
institutional environment and the strategic choices of actors influence the design of organizations’ control
packages. In a similar vein, Guerreiro, Rodrigues and Craig (2012) demonstrated that institutional
pressures influenced decisions to voluntarily adopt International Financial Reporting Standards. Lander,
Koene and Linssen (2013) explored the strategic responses adopted by mid-tier accounting firms when
faced with conflicting trustee and commercial logics. They revealed a process of “blending
experimentation” in which actors combined different elements of multiple logics.
Second, researchers have found that when accounting practices and instruments are transformed,
other organizational practices, and indeed even the whole field and its associated logics, are often
transformed too. Oakes, Townley and Cooper (1998) studied how the mechanisms of control involved in
business planning processes transformed the identity of producers by changing the capital of a field.
Ahrens and Chapman (2007) showed how management control systems both shaped and were shaped by
shared norms and understandings, which institutional theorists would refer to as logics. Lastly, Ezzamel et
al. (2012) studied the sources of practice variation in institutional change by exploring the introduction of
new accounting practices. They notably argued that budgeting technologies contributed to institutional
change by providing new tools for cognition, stating “budgeting was not a neutral technology of
representation within the field: budgeting both represents and intervenes” (Ezzamel et al., 2012, p. 19).
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The above studies show that accounting scholars have demonstrated the essential mediating function
of instruments — such as accounting standards and financial criteria — in the transformation of practices
in relation to their institutional environments. In their historical overview of the discipline, Miller and
Power (2013) identified this mediating role as being one of the four key functions of accounting.
Summarizing these relationships, Miller and O’Leary (2007) coined the concept of “mediating
instruments” that “operate as both means of representation and means of intervention, connecting with,
yet remaining distinct from the object of intervention” (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011, p. 222). Miller and
O’Leary (2007) showed how Moore’s law and technology roadmaps acted as mediating instruments by
helping to link a multitude of actors and domains to protect future markets in the microprocessor
industry. This relationship has also been studied in other fields, such as auditing (Mennicken, 2008) and
education (Ezzamel et al., 2012).
Scholars of the sociology of science and social studies of finance have sought to explain this mediating
role of instruments by asserting that instruments have performative functions (e.g., Callon, 1998; Vollmer,
Mennicken, & Preda, 2009). The concept of performativity explains how instruments have the capacity
“to transform transaction forms, rules and objects” (Vollmer et al., 2009) or to prevent change by
reinforcing existing logics. Central to this role are the “interrelated issues of calculation, calculative agency
and the conditions under which the latter arise” (Miller & O’Leary, 2007, p. 710). According to Callon
(1998), calculation and agency are two sides of the same coin, and calculativeness could not exist without
calculative devices. Calculative devices include analytical tools and techniques such as equations, financial
models, and criteria that help actors engage in decision making (Callon & Muniesa, 2005; Preda, 2009).
Specifically, MacKenzie (2011) showed that the “clusters of evaluation practices” associated with
calculative devices (a concept loosely analogous to Knorr-Cetina’s “epistemic cultures” (Knorr-Cetina,
1999, p. 1783)) sustain distinctive ontologies (distinctive presuppositions about the nature and properties
of the features and processes of the economic world) even when the types of products are very similar,
such as ABSs and CDOs 1. He suggested that clusters of evaluation practices are path-dependent and that
the interactions between them and the ways in which they become organizational routines contribute to
explaining major institutional events, such as the 2008 financial crisis. In doing so, MacKenzie reminded
us that the relationships between actors and their instruments are expected to be at least as important as
the relationships within and between organizations and their institutional environments. However, few

1

ABSs (asset-backed securities, most importantly mortgage-backed securities) and CDOs (collateralized debt
obligations).
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studies have explored the mechanisms through which instruments can play a mediating role in institutional
transformation, and the conditions under which the mediating role of instruments is possible, especially at
the micro level. According to Jones et al. (2013, p. 69), we need to better theorize the role of instruments
in the transformation of logics in order to understand how different logics and practices become anchored
in organizations.
Theorizing the relationships between logics, practices and instruments: the challenge of disentanglement
A number of scholars have pointed to the centrality of practice change as a basis of institutional
transformation (e.g., Jones et al., 2013; Lounsbury, 2008; Smets et al., 2012; Thornton et al., 2012; Weick,
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Smets et al. (2012) developed an important model of practice-driven
institutional change, providing key insights into how institutional change can emerge from the routine
activities of individuals. Although the authors acknowledged the material dimension of practices (p.879),
their model included no material element and did not delve into the role of instruments.
One explanation for this lack of theorization is the inherent difficulty of disentangling the
relationships between logics, instruments, and practices. Jarzabkowski (2008, p. 623) explained that logics
“are instantiated and adapted in the daily lives of individuals”. Powell and Colyvas (2008, p. 276) similarly
argued that “institutional logics are instantiated in and carried by individuals through their actions, tools
and technologies.” Yet, it is essential to avoid conflating practices, logics, and instruments. Indeed, while
logics are instantiated at the practice level, it is most important to remember that logics refer to guiding
principles underlying the practices of a field (Thornton et al., 2012) while practices relate to the actual
patterns of activities enacted by actors in their work (Schatzki, 2001, p. 2). While no institutional change
can occur at the field level without a change in the enactment of logics at the practice level, this does not
mean that logics and practices are interchangeable constructs. Instruments enable the evaluation and
valuation of practices (the latter term referring to the attribution of value). They both classify and signify
the world (Kjellberg & Mallard, 2013). Just as there is an indeterminate relationship between a logic and a
set of practices, such that practices both enact and produce logics, so instruments are both vehicles by
which practices are represented and produced, both a “means of representation and means of
intervention” (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011, p. 222).
Our goal should be to understand how instruments are both deployed to represent an institutional
logic, yet are also variably productive of the logic, the world of practice, and the objects through which
that practice and logic are effected. Several researchers have attempted to theorize the relationships
between logics, practices, and instruments. There are, however, few empirical examples of the calculative
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practices of actors at work (Beunza & Stark, 2004; Kalthoff, 2005). For instance, Kaghan and Lounsbury
reported how institutional logics shape how instruments “are constructed, used and understood” (Kaghan
& Lounsbury, 2005, p. 260), but not how instruments could influence the understanding and
transformation of logics. Friedland (2013) acknowledged this recursive relationship, but neither he
accounted for the mechanisms through which it could occur, nor did he offer empirical analysis. Ezzamel
et al. (2012) went further, exploring how new institutional logics were relayed by accounting technologies
at the field level, which then triggered new organizational practices. However, the study does not explain
“the way that budgeting, as a technology of ‘representation’, has created the conditions through which
these tensions have been played” (Ezzamel et al., 2012, p. 19). As Miller and O’Leary (2007, p. 701)
explained:

The term “institution” is a convenient shorthand for designating the ways in which
the beliefs of actors in persistent technological change become routine and taken for
granted (MacKenzie, 1996, p. 58). But we need a fuller understanding of how this
process of “embedding” is achieved, what practices or instruments help link the
actions and expectations of actors across formally separate and diverse domains.

This article aims to address this concern by, as Nicolini (2009) put it, “zooming in” on the
transformation of an industry logic and its associated practices and instruments within an organization.
Drawing on the concept of mediating instruments (Miller & O’Leary, 2007), this article explores how and
why instruments — specifically calculative devices — both triggered and prevented the transformation of
practices associated with two different types of products, equity and fixed-income funds, following
demands for socially responsible investment.
Research context

Socially responsible investment is still evolving. For the purposes of this study, SRI is defined as the
integration of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria into investment decisions in the belief
that this will generate better long-term financial performance and contribute to propelling financial
markets toward sustainability. In France, most asset managers adopt a best-in-class approach, which
consists of selecting the most socially responsible and financially interesting companies, irrespective of
their industry, so armaments manufacturers or alcohol producers can be included in an SRI portfolio, if
they are among the most socially responsible firms in their segment.
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During the period covered by the study, an increasing number of French asset management
companies were facing growing client demands for SRI, who hoped to achieve better long-term financial
performance and increase the legitimacy of their investors in the eyes of society (Arjaliès, 2010). At the
end of 2009, an estimated 90% of assets under management by conventional funds included at least one
ESG criterion, compared with 61% at the end of 2008 and 3% at the end of 2007 (Novethic, 2010). In
contrast, purely SRI funds represented only 3% of total assets.

Despite this growth, the positive relationship between SRI and financial performance had yet to be
demonstrated, and asset managers were finding it difficult to achieve optimal financial and SRI
performance simultaneously. 2 Asset managers often perceived the new demands for SRI as contradictory
to the financial logic of the industry. Strongly anchored in market capitalism, asset managers were said to
be rational and fixated on maximizing wealth (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007), aiming to increase
profits by optimizing risk and return and effectively being guided by economic theories, such as portfolio
theory for equity investment and the yield curve for fixed-income investment (Laurel, 2013). The key
features of the financial logic that dominated the asset management industry are summarized in Table 1.
SRI imposed non-financial constraints on investment decisions, and was often judged to be detrimental to
financial performance. In addition, no public organization, including the national stock market’s regulatory
body, controlled the SRI content of SRI funds. Consequently, any asset management company could
claim that its funds were socially responsible. The resulting multiple competing claims served only to
increase the confusion among clients about what was and was not SRI (see Appendix A for information
on the definition of an SRI fund).

-----------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
------------------------------------

2

The 2007 UNEP-FI report “Demystifying Responsible Investment Performance” reviews the 20 most influential
studies on the relationship between SRI and financial performance without reaching any firm conclusions. The AP7
report, published in 2011, analyzed 21 academic studies published after UNEP-FI’s report and confirms the absence
of any systematic relationship, whether positive, negative, or neutral.
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Against this background, SRI Invest 3, a small asset management subsidiary of one of the largest
French mutual insurance companies, with EUR 2 billion under management, found itself in an awkward
predicament in 2007. Despite specializing in SRI since 1997, its SRI funds were judged old-fashioned by
the consultants paid by institutional investors to select the best asset management companies to be invited
to tender for investment. Its integration of ESG criteria into investment processes was deemed too
superficial and simplistic, and accordingly its fees for active management 4 were considered unjustifiably
high. Furthermore, SRI Invest found it difficult to demonstrate the added value of its funds over those of
its competitors, both in terms of financial and SRI performance. The company therefore had little chance
of receiving invitations to tender and its survival was under threat.

A new CEO with more than 40 years’ experience in asset management was hired to redesign the
company’s two main practices: equity and fixed-income investment processes (both incorporating SRI).
An equity investment process is the buying, holding, and selling of shares on a stock market in
anticipation of income in the form of dividends and gains on subsequent sales as the value of the stock
rises. A fixed-income investment process, in contrast, consists of lending money to a borrower for a
certain period of time in exchange for interest (also known as debt management). 5 These differences will
be further outlined below.

To redesign the investment processes, the CEO launched two working groups, one for each type of
investment. Each group was composed of representatives from the sales (two project managers), asset
management (two asset managers and one financial analyst), and SRI departments (three SRI analysts);
only the asset managers were different in the two groups. The goal of each working group was to redesign
investment processes in order to meet the new demands for SRI while maintaining good financial
performance. Figure 1 shows the organizational chart of SRI Invest.

3

SRI Invest is a pseudonym.

4

Active management refers to a portfolio management strategy in which the manager aims to outperform his/her
benchmark index.
5

This article focuses on the managers of investment-grade fixed-income assets. A security is considered to be
investment-grade if it has an S&P rating of BBB- or higher, a Moody’s rating of Baa3 or higher, a Fitch rating of
BBB- or higher, or if it has the equivalent minimum rating from another nationally recognized credit rating agency.
Fixed-income securities that are below investment-grade are often referred to as “junk bonds.” The fixed-income
managers under study in the article invest in both corporate and sovereign bonds.
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-----------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
------------------------------------

Research methods

Research design

Given the research objective of identifying and understanding practice “as it happens” (Schatzki,
2005), an ethnographic approach seemed especially appropriate. As such, I embarked on a three-year
project placement with SRI Invest. From May 2006 to May 2009, I worked as an SRI analyst and was
allowed to use the data I collected for academic purposes. My involvement with this company took the
form of a doctoral agreement between SRI Invest, my university, and myself, under the control of the
French Ministry of Research. 6 Given my dual status as a Ph.D. student and an SRI analyst, my role was
twofold: to provide SRI analysis of the sectors I was responsible for, and to report on my research to both
the company and my university. This study was part of a broader industry-wide research project examining
whether and how the financial logic of the French asset management industry was changing following the
growing demand for SRI. The broader industry-level study revealed that most asset management
companies were in the same situation as SRI Invest, although SRI Invest began redesigning its funds later
than its competitors. Throughout the research, three main types of data sources were used: participative
observation, interviews, and documentary evidence.

Data sources

6

Known as a CIFRE (Industrial Contracts for Training through Research).
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Participative observation. I visited the company almost every day during two and a half years of my research
contract (2006–2009) (six months were dedicated to the writing of my Ph.D.). As an SRI analyst, I
analyzed two sectors — financial services and utilities — using the calculative devices of each type of
investment on a daily basis. I attended all the meetings of both working groups and also gleaned
information from informal situations like coffee and lunch breaks. I spoke regularly at the meetings,
together with the other SRI analysts. For instance, I explained the potential effects of asset managers’
suggestions on the analysis of SRI in my own two sectors. Following a reflexive ethnographic approach
(Whyte, 1943), I kept a detailed diary describing the main events of each day spent at SRI Invest. The final
diary comprised hundreds of pages of notes. In order to gain insights at the industry level, I also took part
in think tank events, working groups, SRI roadshows, conferences, and business meetings with
consultants, agencies, and brokers, attending nearly 40 formal events per year. These formal meetings were
complemented by many informal discussions with various industry actors.

Semi-structured interviews. In May 2006, I conducted initial interviews with most company members to get a
better understanding of the firm’s asset management operations. In February and March 2009, I
conducted interviews lasting between one and two hours with all members of the two working groups and
the Director of Support Functions. All 2009 interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. All actors
were asked to explain their feelings, their understanding of the situation, how the redesign took place in
practice, why they acted in a certain way, how they interpreted the reactions of other group members, and
if they thought the redesign was right. At the end of each interview, they were asked if they considered the
redesign successful and why, and which key events they remembered. To complement this insider
perspective (Schotter, 2010), I conducted over 40 interviews across the industry from July 2007 to March
2009. These included interviews with five asset management companies, four financial institutions, two
brokers, two trade unions, four consultants, one trade association, two NGOs, one pension fund, one
think tank, and five social rating agencies. The purpose of using a cross-level design (i.e., practice and field
levels) (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 185) was to be sure that the financial logic studied at the working group
level was a good reflection of the institutional logic in the field.

Documents and secondary evidence. I collected and scrutinized large volumes of data, including minutes of
meetings, e-mails, calculative devices, and presentations of processes to clients. My analysis also included
documents and secondary sources at the industry level, including trade association surveys, professional
reports (by consultants, asset managers, brokers, and social rating agencies), NGO studies, newspapers,
newsletters, and websites. Further details are provided in Appendices B and C.
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Data analysis

The study followed an abductive process of going back and forth between the data, the literature, and
the company (Dewey, 1938; Lorino, Tricard, & Clot, 2011; Lukka & Modell, 2010). For instance,
conducting interviews at the industry level soon revealed that other firms were experiencing similar issues
to SRI Invest. This revelation triggered my curiosity regarding the reasons for these problems and I
regularly referred to them during meetings, in e-mails, and in informal discussions, systematically asking
participants for their interpretations.

In the course of the process, I developed an “emerging coding” system (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).
Specifically codes emerged from the collected data, in this case “lack of ESG criteria,” “financial
performance,” “client demands,” and so on. Each e-mail and document collected (between five and 20 emails per day and five documents per week in all) was categorized accordingly. The same coding was used
for the industry-level interviews, which helped me to refine my categories. For instance, I asked social
rating agencies and brokers whether they encountered difficulties with fixed-income investment. I also
discussed issues with SRI analysts in other asset management companies to ascertain whether they were
having the same problems. Five months after the working groups were launched, I started to piece
together the work done from my notes, e-mails, and documents to see how the different problems
emerged. These results were triangulated with industry-level data to identify which problems were specific
to SRI Invest and which were more broadly applicable to the industry as a whole. I also thoroughly
examined the calculative devices (mainly Excel files and databases) available in the company to see
whether the asset managers’ complaints about ESG criteria were justified. In order to validate these
findings, ten months after the working groups were disbanded I interviewed all the people who had been
members of both groups and convened a collective meeting to reflect on what had happened. Before the
interviews and meeting, each interviewee read a draft of an earlier version of this paper provided as a
discussion aid. I also discussed my research findings with other practitioners at the industry level. I
maintained an informal dialogue with several key members of SRI Invest until we reached consensus on
the findings and no alternative explanations were being suggested. This point was reached at the beginning
of January 2010. My main concern throughout was to account for how and why the financial logic
instantiated within the two types of products had (not) been transformed.
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While ethnographic research has been used before in social studies of finance (Vollmer et al., 2009),
one potential concern is that the researcher may unconsciously guide the research process, introducing a
bias toward the expected findings. This study attempted to overcome such bias by inviting continuous
critical feedback from both practitioners and researchers and triangulating the different sources of data.
Given the length of the research period and the wide-ranging array of interviews, observations,
documents, and secondary data, I was able to obtain rich contextual detail.

Case study

Equity working group

The first working group meeting relating to equity investment took place in September 2007 and was
chaired by the Director of Sales and SRI. The investment process had not changed for ten years and
consisted of three stages: first, SRI grades provided by two social rating agencies were used to draw up a
ranking of companies based on their ESG performance; second, SRI analysts conducted further analysis
on all the shortlisted companies; third, asset managers selected companies for the portfolios so as to
ensure that the fund’s SRI grade (obtained by adding each company’s grade) was above average.

The sales representatives were convinced that the consultants’ criticism of the firm’s SRI funds was
solely due to miscommunication. As such, they asked the asset managers and SRI analysts to give a more
detailed description of their work by providing written assessments for 300 companies. Each assessment
included a one-page explanation of the SRI grades, which were based on hundreds of ESG and financial
criteria together with the SRI analysts’ and asset managers’ own professional opinions. The analysts and
asset managers were unhappy with this request, which would be extremely time-consuming to fulfill. They
believed the problem lay not in miscommunication, but in the selection of companies. Working group
discussions were heated: the Director of Sales and SRI interpreted the SRI analysts’ and asset managers’
reluctance as a refusal to work, and the analysts and asset managers felt the Director did not understand
SRI.
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Despite this disagreement, the working group tried, over a period of several weeks, to design
PowerPoint presentations describing the various stages of the investment process. It also worked on the
content of the one-page assessment. This brought up a number of questions regarding the process of
selecting companies, such as which ESG criteria should be selected for each sector, and what balance
should be struck between ESG and financial criteria. Two months after the launch of the working groups,
three people from the three different departments (sales, SRI, and asset management) began to discuss
these questions informally before deciding to seek a solution together and unofficially assume the
leadership of the working group. They carefully studied what competitors were doing and compared this
with the funds run by SRI Invest. The limitations of SRI Invest’s funds became clear: the asset manager
lacked room to maneuver when selecting companies and the ESG criteria were too simplistic. Moreover,
no company was excluded merely for SRI reasons, although “SRI selectivity,” the performance criterion
that assessed the proportion of companies excluded for SRI reasons, was deemed very important by
clients. The purpose of the working group now became twofold: to give the asset manager more freedom
in company selection by loosening the SRI constraint, and to increase funds’ SRI selectivity. Since many
companies deemed financially sound were considered “SRI laggards” and vice versa, the main challenge
was to reach high SRI selectivity without endangering financial performance.

At every meeting, each department put forward new ideas to the other two departments. In response
to these ideas, the departments worked together on proposals that could meet the requirements of them
all, and gradually, a new way of selecting companies was developed. Meanwhile, the working group looked
at how other asset management companies were identifying investment opportunities. Between meetings,
the sales department incorporated the new proposals into its PowerPoint presentations of the investment
processes and submitted them to clients and consultants for feedback.

Throughout this process, the SRI analysts and asset managers worked on new ESG criteria that they
believed would influence financial performance. They reduced the weighting of ESG criteria they
considered less important for the long-term survival of companies, such as donations to charity. They
closely studied companies with contradictory financial and SRI profiles. They wanted to find out whether
ESG criteria provided information that the market did not incorporate, or whether ESG criteria were
meaningless in business terms. For this purpose, they developed a database of SRI grades and translated
their own financial and SRI knowledge of companies into grades in order to test the relationship between
SRI and financial performance with an econometric approach. This gave rise to a “decision matrix”
method that compared the SRI and financial rankings of each company (see Figure 2).
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-----------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here
------------------------------------

The existing SRI grade in the portfolio was replaced by the profile defined under this matrix in order
to favor companies with the best combinations of SRI and financial profiles. Companies considered
laggards in both finance and SRI terms would therefore be excluded from the portfolio. Depending on
their position in the matrix, other companies would be over, equally, or underrepresented in portfolios
compared to their benchmark indices (i.e., DJ Eurostoxx 300). Five months after the launch of the
working group, a new investment process had been redesigned on paper (see Figure 3). As ESG criteria
had been reframed in terms of financial performance requirements, this new process was deemed
appropriate to meet both SRI and financial demands.

-----------------------------------Insert Figure 3 about here
------------------------------------

Nevertheless, SRI Invest needed clearance from the French financial authorities before it could
implement the new investment process. It also needed to test the investment process on fictitious
portfolios to determine the tracking error. 7 Over a four-month period, the working group continued to
meet weekly to discuss the results of these tests. Meanwhile, all staff behaved as though the new
investment process was already in place. The SRI analysts and asset managers assessed companies using
their new criteria and matrix. In May 2008, SRI Invest received clearance and the tests were declared
successful. The asset manager began to implement the new investment process for existing portfolios,
which involved divesting and reallocating assets. Only a few weeks later, however, difficulties appeared
concerning SRI selectivity. Too many companies with a good financial profile were being excluded for
SRI reasons, endangering financial performance by significantly reducing the investment universe. Asset

7

Measure of how closely a portfolio follows the index to which it is benchmarked.
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managers had an obligation to respect the risk/diversification ratios inherent in constructing an optimal
portfolio when selecting companies. 8 Consequently, the SRI analysts and asset managers decided to
reduce the proportion of companies excluded for SRI reasons alone (i.e., companies belonging to the
“laggards” category), first to 40% and then to as low as 25%. Ten months after its launch, the working
group was officially disbanded and the new investment process was deemed successful. This meant that
the fund process was considered “good” compared to its peers and that the integration of ESG criteria
generated adequate financial and SRI performance to justify added value, in comparison to other actively
managed funds.

Fixed-income working group

In the fixed-income working group, the selection of companies and public issuers followed a threestage process. First, an SRI ranking was obtained by compiling SRI grades issued by two social rating
agencies: one SRI ranking for OECD countries and one SRI ranking for companies belonging to the DJ
Eurostoxx 600 index (the same analysis was used for equity investment); then, asset managers selected
issuers according to their financial criteria; and thirdly, SRI analysts ensured that the portfolio’s overall SRI
grade was above average, regardless of whether there were sovereign or corporate bonds. Since asset
managers could also select companies that did not belong to the index, SRI analysts could not assess all
companies included in the portfolio.

During the first working group meeting, each department submitted its ideas to the other two
departments. The sales representatives admitted they had few ideas. They had studied what competitors
were doing and none seemed to be using a different investment process. However, they urged the other
two departments to find a way to meet the growing client demand for SRI funds. The SRI analysts
acknowledged their lack of experience in fixed-income investment but were keen to redesign the whole
investment process in order to attain high SRI selectivity. The asset manager was against this idea, arguing
that strengthening reference to ESG criteria would jeopardize the funds’ financial performance.

8

In theory, it is possible to construct an “efficient frontier” of optimal portfolios offering the maximum possible
expected return for a given level of risk. A key principle of this theory is holding a diversified portfolio of assets in
order to reduce the exposure to individual asset risk. Excluding companies for SRI reasons threatens this
diversification by reducing the investment universe.
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For weeks, the working group could not agree on what should be done. Two months after its first
meeting, an SRI analyst and a sales representative decided to work informally on a new investment
process. Believing that the SRI grade did not significantly influence the investment process, they asked the
asset manager to change his way of selecting issuers to rely more on SRI grades. The asset manager
responded that the request was unrealistic, adding that fixed-income investment was far more complicated
than equity investment and that SRI analysts, lacking a financial background, could not understand the
potential threat ESG criteria posed to financial performance. The SRI analyst and the sales representative
felt that the asset manager had a condescending attitude. One month later, the working group became
deadlocked and the asset manager refused to attend any further meetings.

The sales representative and SRI analyst continued to work on the investment process, focusing on
increasing SRI selectivity. After a few weeks, they had ideas for new ESG criteria but could not test them
in practice. They realized that they did not know how the asset manager’s selection process worked. Once
again, they analyzed competitors’ practices and clients’ demands, but the whole industry seemed to be in
the same situation: nobody really knew what SRI should consist of. Discouraged by this lack of consensus,
they abandoned the search.

Five months after the launch of the working group, SRI Invest found itself in a predicament. Its very
survival was threatened by the 2008 financial crisis. The SRI equity funds had lost almost half of their
assets, which meant a 50% decrease in the company’s revenues. It was now imperative to redesign fixedincome funds to meet the new invitations to tender that consequently favored fixed-income at the expense
of equity investment. The CEO decided to re-launch the working group. He organized a brainstorming
session during which all actors were required to contribute ideas, however extreme. The SRI analyst and
sales representative who had been most active previously made several suggestions: 1) to change the SRI
ranking of companies in the same way as the equity investment group; 2) to add new ESG criteria to the
SRI ranking used for countries, and reframe it in a sector approach encompassing developed versus less
developed countries; 3) to oblige asset managers to invest at least 70% of fund assets in companies
assessed by SRI analysts; and 4) to exclude all issuers ranked as “SRI laggards.” The asset manager agreed
with the first three proposals, but was strongly opposed to the last because he felt it would endanger
financial performance. The SRI analysts openly complained about the redesign project, saying that
financial performance was clearly being favored over SRI selectivity. The atmosphere became very tense.
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The CEO did not want to endanger financial performance and asked the SRI analysts to find a better
solution before adjourning the meeting and scheduling another for three days later.

At the next meeting, an SRI analyst put forward a solution inspired by the “prudent mean” rules
developed in the nineteenth century to limit the power of large shareholders in US corporations. It
consisted of limiting the proportion of assets from a single issuer according to its SRI ranking (see Figure
4). Issuers with the best SRI grades (referred to as category M1) had to make up at least X% of the
portfolio’s assets, while the proportion of other issuers was limited. For instance, issuers from category
Q1 could not make up more than Y%. This was a way to favor issuers with the best SRI profiles without
excluding issuers with bad SRI profiles. Opinions differed as to the proportions, but everybody approved
of the process. One month later, a new process had been redesigned on paper, ready for the asset manager
to implement the following month.

-----------------------------------Insert Figure 4 about here
------------------------------------

Nine months after the working group’s initial launch, the SRI analyst and the sales representative
who took over the group began to doubt whether the SRI constraint had any real influence. They voiced
their concerns to the asset manager, who replied that he had significantly changed the way he selected the
issuers out of respect for the SRI constraint. However, they were not convinced. Two months later, an
informal discussion confirmed their impression: the asset manager declared that ESG criteria were useless
in his investment activity. In his opinion, SRI was still meaningless for fixed-income investment and was
nothing more than a formality to be complied with. To be of any use, he believed ESG criteria should
resemble financial criteria and help him identify the companies most likely to go bankrupt. The SRI
analysts advised that this was not possible.

Findings

SRI as enriching the financial logic or constraining it
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After one year of process redesign, two different outcomes had emerged. The equity working group
perceived SRI as relevant for their investment activity, whereas the fixed-income group questioned the
added value of SRI in the investment processes:

The good thing about fixed-income is that we can still greatly improve the process,
because at the moment we’re in a pretty bad place. There are still things to do. The
question is: “What does SRI bring to the process?” And I don’t know... […] We need
more explanations of what fixed-income managers do, how they work, what a risk
means for them. Once we’ve got that, we can start to think about what a true SRI
process should be. (SRI analyst)

However, when asked about the differences between the two working groups, SRI Invest members
were vague. They found it difficult to explain exactly how the fixed-income working group was different.
They began by explaining the divergences between the working groups in terms of power relationships:

For SRI to be deeply integrated into the [equity investment] selection processes, right
from the moment companies were selected, the asset manager had to validate the
investment process that was proposed in the working group. He had to accept it, be
fully committed to the redesign, see and say if this would impact his tracking error,
etc. […] In the fixed-income group, I would say the opposite applied. It was the asset
manager who won, but I wanted that to be the case because I didn’t believe that such
integration of SRI was feasible in fixed-income. […] Honestly, I don’t see how SRI
could play anything but a marginal or minority role in fixed-income. (CEO)

What happened in the working groups confirmed this assertion. The fixed-income manager clearly
resisted the redesign process, as evidenced by his leaving the working group in November 2007. However,
when the CEO decided to re-launch the fixed-income working group because of the financial crisis, the
asset manager had no choice but to change his investment activity. SRI analysts were forced to adapt to
the constraints the asset manager set, which included not being allowed to exclude SRI laggards. However,
the equity working group made a similar adaption, although it appeared to be made more willingly, when
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SRI selectivity was lowered from 50% to 40% and then 25%. In both working groups, the SRI analysts
had to adapt to the position of the asset manager and vice versa. For example, the fixed-income manager
was not allowed to “gamble” (i.e., invest 10% of the fund’s assets) on any company considered a laggard
in terms of SRI. Yet this situation did occur a few times, and occasionally proved costly in terms of
financial performance. In both groups, all parties had to compromise to progress the redesign of the
investment process.

Despite the investment constraints, there was a feeling that SRI had hardly influenced fixed-income
investment at all. As noted above, the CEO felt SRI had only a marginal role in fixed-income investment,
whereas SRI was integral to the selection processes for equity investment. This analysis was confirmed by
the doubts expressed by the SRI analyst and sales representative over the real impact of SRI on the fixedincome manager’s practices. Consequently, the fixed-income situation could be interpreted in terms of
“decoupling” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Since financial and SRI demands proved contradictory, SRI Invest
could be seen as decoupling its symbolic displays from its technical operations. But this interpretation
would be misleading for two reasons. First, the fixed-income manager was investing subject to constraints
and his practices were affected by ESG criteria. Second, it would be difficult to tell whether the equity
manager was subject to more constraints than the fixed-income manager. Is an obligation not to invest
more than 10% of fund assets in a single company, when there are in fact few alternatives available on the
market, a lesser constraint than excluding 25% of companies from a universe of 300? It is a difficult
question to answer.

Actually, when the CEO stated that SRI played “a marginal or minority role” in fixed-income
investment, he was not referring to the impact of SRI on investment practices themselves but to SRI’s
effect on how the financial logic was understood and instantiated within this type of product. While the
financial logic of equity investment was enriched by the new demands for SRI, the financial logic of fixedincome investment remained almost unchanged, maintaining a view according to which SRI demands
threatened financial performance. A discussion with each asset manager about what SRI brought to their
“identities and valuation orders” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) clearly illustrates this difference.

Discussion with the equity manager:
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RESEARCHER: Has the incorporation of SRI changed the way you invest?
EQUITY MANAGER: Yes. It’s made it more interesting, more elaborate and it enhances
the investment activity. […] It’s surprising, but you sometimes see companies with a
very good financial profile and a very bad SRI profile. When you read financial
analyses, they appear to be excellent. But when you listen to the SRI analysts, they
describe things that aren’t working inside those companies. So I wonder how such
companies can succeed at the end of the day. How can they make up for bad working
conditions, for example?
RESEARCHER: So you like managing SRI funds?
EQUITY MANAGER: Yes, I do. I hope that this type of management will be fully
recognized one day. […]
RESEARCHER: So you feel that you are an SRI equity asset manager?
EQUITY MANAGER: Yes. That’s how I perceive myself, and it’s how I introduce
myself.

Discussion with the fixed-income manager:

RESEARCHER: What does SRI mean for you?
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: It’s a constraint you have to abide by when investing, like
any constraint.
RESEARCHER: When a constraint applies, is it difficult to manage?
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: It’s always difficult to manage a constraint.
RESEARCHER: Is that because it’s an SRI constraint?
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: No, no. It’s not linked to the fact that it’s an SRI
constraint.
RESEARCHER: OK. So SRI is a constraint like any other constraint. But does it
contribute anything to your investment activity?
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FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: Personally, I don’t think so.

The difference between the two asset managers’ interpretations of the role of SRI in investment
activity was substantial. The equity manager judged that SRI had enriched investment activity by making it
more interesting and more elaborate. He believed SRI had expanded his knowledge of companies. He
took ESG criteria into consideration when selecting companies because he felt that those criteria bolstered
his financial analysis by providing new information. His cognitive operations and the selection, projection,
and evaluation of the outcomes of market transactions (Preda, 2009) had been transformed. Furthermore,
he introduced himself as an SRI equity manager, meaning his professional identity, too, had changed.
Hence, the “identities and valuation orders” (i.e., the financial logic) (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) of equity
investment had come to incorporate SRI concerns.

In contrast, the fixed-income manager described SRI in terms of constraints and did not relate SRI to
his selection process. To him, the content of the constraint made no difference because it did not
influence his investment activity. It was a constraint like any other. In contrast to the situation in equity
investment, SRI had not penetrated the financial logic of fixed-income investment. Neither the asset
manager’s cognitive operations nor identity had changed. He selected companies according to his previous
financial logic, and then adapted his choices to meet the SRI constraint. Therefore, contrary to the spirit
of SRI, the fixed-income manager did not believe SRI was a key element of a successful investment
strategy. The CEO explained:

This brings us back to the fundamental problem. In equity, everybody can understand
that SRI is a positive thing for investment activity; it’s intrinsically linked to the
management of companies. […] But to all the fixed-income managers in Paris, and
almost all the fixed-income managers in the world, integrating SRI into investment
activity means nothing. (CEO)

Different “clusters of evaluation practices”
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The fundamental difference between the two groups results from the fact that the transformation of
the fixed-income process following the new demands for SRI meant nothing to the asset manager. A key
element to understanding this difference concerns the added value that SRI brings to the issuer selection
process. While it helped the equity manager select the companies most likely to succeed, the fixed-income
manager perceived it to be meaningless. This divergent opinion clearly reflects the differences in terms of
“clusters of evaluation practices” (MacKenzie, 2011) associated with the calculative devices used in each
type of product. The CEO explained:

There’s something abstract about fixed income; it’s an actuarial model […] fixed
income can’t be embodied in reality, so it’s difficult to incorporate SRI. […] In equity,
there’s an idea of durability, effort, success and long-term existence for the fund that
embodies SRI. In fixed income, all investments involve permanent arbitrage 9, so
there’s total volatility. It’s very difficult to embody something that is linked to
sustainability in an investment that is, by design, volatile. (CEO)

When equity managers select a company for a fund, they believe that the company will succeed and
generate profits, which will contribute to an increase in shareholder value. Managers must invest in all
sectors in order to spread the risk, and therefore aim to select the two or three companies in each industry
that appear to be the most financially promising in the long run. They first identify potentially interesting
companies in each industry in the investment universe concerned, and then select the most profitable
companies in each industry based on their own criteria, company knowledge, and personal experience, in
compliance with the risk and financial ratios set at the portfolio level. This usually leads to adjustments in
the industry weightings within portfolios.

Fixed-income managers, in contrast, lend money to a borrower for a defined period of time. In this
case, the goal is to select the issuers that offer the best interest rate and the best likelihood of reimbursing
the loan. If a company goes bankrupt, the asset manager loses all the money lent. The issuers may be
private companies or public institutions, such as countries or cities. Although a bankruptcy risk also exists
in equity investment, it is not considered to be as important owing to the different perceptions of risks in

9

Arbitrage is the practice of taking advantage of a price difference between two or more markets.
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the two types of investments. Fixed-income investment is judged to be very safe, since the return is a
given; it is therefore of primary importance that its only risk — that of default on payment — should be
very well managed. 10 On the contrary, the goal of equity investment is to generate excess returns (the
“alpha”) for which investors are prepared to take more risks, including the risk of bankruptcy. What
matters is achieving the expected performance.

The interest rates used in fixed-income investment change over time for a variety of reasons, most of
them macroeconomic. For example, if there are few actors in the market with free cash to lend, the issuer
will have to offer a higher rate of interest. Consequently, there is an inverse relationship between interest
rates and bond prices. A fixed-income manager therefore relies heavily on the yield curve (see Figure 5)
and actuarial models, rather than other financial and business criteria. Given the importance of these
models, fixed-income investment can be described as far more mathematically driven than equity
investment.

-----------------------------------Insert Figure 5 about here
------------------------------------

It follows that how companies and countries react to climate change or human rights issues, for
example, does not affect the fixed-income manager’s investment decisions, since those reactions influence
interest rates only marginally. Instead, such reactions are expected to contribute to an increase in the
company’s share value in the future, a factor of primary importance to the equity manager. This is the
reason why the CEO says that the effort of a company will be rewarded in equity investment by success,
whereas investment decisions in fixed-income investment will be principally influenced by arbitrage
benefits.

10

The debt crisis that followed obviously contributed to the questioning of some strong beliefs shared in fixedincome investment.
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The perception of reality as abstract (i.e., decoupled from the actual behavior of issuers) is reinforced
by the relationship of fixed-income investment to time. An equity investment manager buying shares is
interested in the future increase in their stock market value. In this case, the idea conveyed by SRI makes
sense: if a company anticipates and plans for costs linked to below-average performance in ESG domains,
it is more likely to succeed and see its share value increase. The use of ESG criteria can expand the equity
asset manager’s knowledge of companies, providing additional information for calculative devices and
cognitive operations, and therefore investment decisions.

In contrast, the interest rates studied by the fixed-income manager usually depend on the company’s
present borrowing capacity and market conditions. The company’s future success in fixed-income
investment is less important than it is for equity investment. The financial performance of fixed-income
investment results less from an asset manager’s ability to anticipate which companies are more likely to
succeed than from the ability to constantly take advantage of a price differential between different markets.
In other words, fixed-income investment is more concerned with change than stability. This explains why
it is described as volatile and why the long-term rewards approach advanced by SRI is meaningless. In
fact, the only time when future considerations affect fixed-income investment decisions is when an asset
manager tries to anticipate whether a company or country could go bankrupt and default on payment, but
this information could not be provided by SRI analysts (further explanations for this are given in the next
section).

The perceived lack of appropriate calculative devices

The previous section showed that the differences between the distinctive presuppositions about the
nature and properties of the economic world between the two types of evaluations practices and
calculative devices (MacKenzie, 2011, p. 1783) explain why SRI is next to meaningless in fixed-income
investment compared to equity investment. However, it did not clarify why ESG criteria were unable to
identify which companies were most likely to go bankrupt, the main area of fixed-income investment
where SRI could make a contribution. Interestingly, the fixed-income manager explicitly asked the SRI
analysts to provide him with this information, but they found it impossible.
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I found it very positive, except for the content of the request. I remember very clearly
that he asked us to identify the factors that will impact a company’s value. So in short,
he asked us to find the “philosopher’s stone” of SRI. […] To find the essence that all
asset management companies are looking for today, an essence they aren’t finding.
They aren’t finding it because it’s a bit too early, there are no historical data and they
find it difficult to identify all these things. (SRI analyst)

According to the SRI analyst, the lack of historical data explains why no relationship had yet been
identified connecting ESG criteria and the probability of going bankrupt. One way of understanding this
problem was to ask the fixed-income asset manager what form the ESG criteria should have taken for it
to be more helpful:

RESEARCHER: So, in theory, ESG criteria could be useful for you but they’re no help
at the moment?
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: Exactly, since we don’t have anything to measure them,
there’s no point in looking at them [ESG criteria]. […] I think that [social] rating
agencies are totally incapable of doing this. […] They [ESG criteria] are so
approximate that it’s impossible to rely on them.
RESEARCHER: You mean that finance is much more reliable?
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: I think so. First, there are a lot more obligations that
concern finance: very simple things such as publishing the accounts, having them
certified, etcetera. […] The data are comparable; they’ve existed for a very long time.
It’s arithmetical, not qualitative. They aren’t declarations or protocols… but concrete
information we can verify.
RESEARCHER: So you can rely on financial criteria, but you cannot rely on ESG
criteria?
FIXED-INCOME MANAGER: Yes, in order to work, ESG criteria should be like
financial criteria. The social rating process should be like the financial one.
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The problem here relates to the form and content of ESG criteria. If ESG criteria are not reliable
because fixed-asset managers cannot measure them, how can an equity manager rely on them? The
explanation lies in their different calculative devices and associated evaluation practices. A fixed-income
manager has a mathematical background and relies mainly on actuarial models, and will therefore probably
expect criteria to be arithmetical rather than qualitative. Fixed income managers cannot deal with
qualitative factors such as ESG criteria because they cannot be included in the calculative devices they use
(e.g., econometric models). Equity managers, in contrast, rely far more on personal knowledge and
experience. They are used to relying as much on financial criteria as on other business criteria such as
governance and social issues, and can therefore more easily integrate ESG criteria into their investment
decisions.

Another problem mentioned by the fixed-income manager is that ESG criteria were first framed on
equity investment’s calculative devices and evaluation practices; that is, according to a sector-based
approach. Indeed, an equity manager aims to select the most financially- and socially-responsible firms in
each sector (with no sector excluded). However, this sector-based approach to ESG criteria actually
prevented the fixed-income manager from incorporating SRI into investment decisions. To better
understand why, Figure 5 provides an example of the sector-based ranking used by SRI analysts compiling
the different social ratings bought by SRI Invest and the personal analysis of its SRI analysts, and Figure 6
provides an example of a company factsheet that summarizes the financial and SRI profile of a company.
First, we can see that the same analysis is used for both equity and fixed-income investment in the case of
corporate issuers. Second, we can clearly see that the types of financial and ESG ratios in use are those
useful for the evaluation practices of equity at the expense of fixed-income investment (with the exception
of the financial structure ratios). For instance, it is difficult to identify a direct relationship between SRI
ratings and the yield curve (see Figure 5).

-----------------------------------Insert Figures 6 and 7 about here
------------------------------------

Taking the example of climate change, imagine company X and company Y, respectively rated
55/100 and 45/100 on the “CO2 emissions” criteria. The 10-point difference might, for example, be a
result of company Y having set no reduction targets. When reporting these ratings to asset managers, SRI
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analysts also offer commentary. They may advise against investing in company Y, or explain that the rating
is one year old and does not reflect the company’s recent efforts, and therefore recommend company Y
instead of company X despite the latter’s poorer grade.

An equity manager would consult SRI analysts to identify companies that are more likely to have high
CO2 emissions: information that asset managers might find useful in selecting which company can be
successful in the future. In this case, both SRI and financial analyses would be included in company
selection because ESG criteria are deemed to affect business. The equity manager explained:

I don’t want to keep a sort of watertight division between SRI analysis and my
analysis. I want them to be correlated. Otherwise, it would mean that I select issuers
on criteria I can’t verify at all, and that wouldn’t be credible for clients. (Equity
manager)

A fixed-income manager, on the other hand, would ask SRI analysts which company would be more
likely to go bankrupt and what to do if only one company offers bonds. But SRI analysts cannot answer
because it is too early to say. No relationship has yet been identified between issues like CO2 emission
levels and the probability of a company going bankrupt. Furthermore, ESG criteria were developed to
facilitate comparisons within sectors. Should the asset manager favor an automobile company with a good
SRI profile over a clean tech company with a bad SRI profile? SRI analysts cannot advise on that. In other
words, ESG criteria do not currently provide the information the fixed-income manager would consider
relevant to investment decisions. Based on these findings, it can be argued that the perceived lack of ESG
criteria corresponding to the evaluation practices and calculative devices of fixed-income investment
largely explains why the financial logic embodied in fixed-income logic was not enriched by the new
demands for SRI.

Discussion

This article has focused on the micro-mechanisms through which the investment practices of two
different products embedded within the same financial logic unfolded over time following new demands
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for SRI. The previous section detailed why SRI Invest personnel perceived that the logic, practices, and
instruments associated with equity investment were enriched by the integration of SRI while viewing those
of fixed-income investment as remaining almost the same, so that SRI was perceived as an external
constraint that just had to be accepted. This section explores the implications of these findings for
theorizing the role of instruments in the transformation of a logic and its associated practices.

The mechanisms through which instruments can mediate the transformation of a logic and its associated practices

Previous research has shown that disentangling the relationships between logics, practices, and
instruments is an extremely difficult task, both empirically and theoretically. This is explained by the fact
that practices are material instantiations of logics (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 128). Nevertheless, analysis of
how the two working groups aimed to integrate the new demands for SRI in their financial logics provides
evidence that, though they remain analytically distinct, instruments, practices, and logics are bound
together in a recursive relationship. It also suggests that instruments specifically mediate the relationships
between logics and their associated practices.

The mutual relationships among financial logics, instruments, and practices are illustrated by the
(in)ability of actors to transform what MacKenzie (2011) referred to as “the cluster of evaluation
practices” associated with each type of investment. On the one hand, the evaluation practices and their
associated ontologies — notably, the relationships between investment decisions and the real economy —
influenced the design of the calculative devices used in the evaluation and valuation processes, which then
reinforced the existing material instantiations of the financial logic. This is evident in the inability of the
working group to integrate ESG criteria into the econometric models used by the fixed-income managers,
resulting in the continuation of the established evaluation practices. On the other hand, the features of
calculative devices influenced the observation, analysis, and calculation processes through which the asset
managers made decisions. The equity manager, for instance, was able to transform financial practices by
incorporating ESG criteria into the decision matrix, which then led him to integrate SRI into the financial
logic itself. In other words, instruments both shaped and were shaped by the existing logic and practices;
they acted as mediating instruments (Miller & O’Leary, 2007) between the logic and its associated
practices.

30

To argue that the logics, instruments, and practices are interlinked, however, requires them not to be
identical. The fact that mediating instruments are distinct from their objects of intervention (Miller &
O’Leary, 2007) is exemplified by the fact that all calculative devices (e.g., ESG criteria, econometric
models, SRI/financial decision matrices, etc.) existed independently of their uses in investment practices
and their meanings for actors. This shows that although calculative devices embodied how actors made
sense of the financial logics, instruments were different from the overall principles that guided behavior in
each type of investment and from the actual practices of the actors involved.

To distinguish between a financial logic and its associated practices — specifically the clusters of
evaluation practices (MacKenzie, 2011) — seems far more difficult. This is because evaluation practices
are defined as “distinctive presuppositions about the nature and properties of the features and processes
of the economic world” (MacKenzie, 2011, p. 1783). This definition is similar to the notion of “evaluation
cultures” (i.e., “aggregate patterns and dynamics that are on display in expert practice and that vary in
different settings of expertise” (Knorr-Cetina, 1999, p. 8)) and to the definition of logics: the principles
that guide behavior in a social situation, providing actors with frames of reference that precondition their
sense-making, acting, and identity choices (Thornton et al., 2012; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton,
2002).

These similar definitions further demonstrate the close relationships between the logics and their
material instantiations in practice. This does not mean, however, that actors are not able to perform
practices that are not guided by the dominant logic of the industry, and/or to propose new guidance. If
that were the case, institutional change would not be possible. For instance, the integration of ESG criteria
into the evaluation practices of the equity asset managers followed their understanding of the financial
logic for this type of investment — that integrating non-financial criteria should help identify those
companies more likely to succeed — but also transformed the financial logic itself by reinforcing the need
for investment decisions to benefit from and serve a sustainable economy. This shows that although the
financial logic provided the rationale for transforming their calculative devices and also investment and
evaluation practices, the actual transformations of those instruments and practices subsequently led to a
transformation of the financial logic. In contrast, while the fixed-income managers did transform their
investment practices by adding an SRI constraint, they did not integrate SRI concerns into the “identities
and valuation orders” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 805) that structured their decision making. SRI
appeared to be an external constraint on the financial logic.
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Based on these findings, it can be argued that instruments, practices, and logics are bound together in
a recursive relationship, while being theoretically and empirically different. Two relationships among the
three elements are then possible: either they are linked to one other directly and/or indirectly, or one
element mediates the relationship between the other two. The definition of a mediating instrument would
tend to naturally argue for the second form of relationship: that instruments connect arenas and actors
(Miller & O’Leary, 2007; Miller & Power, 2013). However, it could also be argued that practices mediate
between logics and instruments. To conclude this argument would definitely require further research on
the relationships between the three elements.

However, the observations and the way the actors explained how they transformed their practices
and the associated financial logic indicated that actors always thought and acted through their instruments.
For instance, they redesigned their investment processes through the use of PowerPoint presentations that
schematized what they were doing, which then helped them re-think the financial logic. They also
transformed their evaluation practices through the transformation of existing (and the creation of new)
calculative devices, such as the decision matrix and the creation of new ESG criteria. Instruments seemed
to act as performative supports without which transforming the financial logic and/or its associated
practices would have been impossible. This is the reason why this article positions instruments as a
medium for transforming the logic and its associated practices.

The conditions under which the co-transformation of the logic, practices, and instruments is possible

The mechanisms through which both working groups aimed to transform their investment practices
following the new demands for SRI were similar: instruments, logics, and their associated practices were
bound in a recursive relationship. However, the outcomes differed in that SRI was integrated into the
financial logic of equity investment but remained an external constraint in fixed-income investment. The
analysis reported above identified several reasons explaining this difference, particularly the perception of
the lack of appropriate calculative devices in the fixed-income investment sphere. Based on these findings,
this section aims to further explore why these devices could not mediate the transformation of the
financial logic and associated practices in fixed-income investment. It identifies two features of the
instruments that are suggested to be key to the transformation of equity investment that were lacking in
the fixed-income investment arena: the perceived flexibility and incompleteness of the calculative devices in
use.
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Two features of the calculative devices used in equity investment appeared essential to their
performative nature: they made asset managers and SRI analysts work together, and they helped generate
new knowledge that enriched previous practices. Indeed, for SRI to be integrated into the practices and
logic of equity investment, it was important that SRI analysts and asset managers could cooperate and that
new knowledge about how to transform investment activity in response to the demand for SRI could
emerge from this cooperation. Several means were used to achieve this, such as holding weekly meetings
to raise issues and suggest new ideas, routine informal discussions, and involving SRI analysts in
invitations to tender. Although these means were clearly facilitators, ultimately the key factor explaining
the greater integration of SRI into the financial logic of equity investment was the design of a new
calculative device: the SRI/Financial decision matrix (see Figure 2).

The decision matrix design made cross-disciplinary work possible by providing a catalyst for
discussion between SRI analysts and asset managers, and to a lesser extent project managers, all of whom
were involved in responding to client demands. Throughout the redesign process, SRI analysts and asset
managers explained, compared, shared, and finally merged their own calculative devices into this decision
matrix. This was possible because the calculative devices were flexible, in that they were sufficiently openended and malleable to enable both SRI and financial concerns to be integrated into the investment
processes. For instance, asset managers added ESG criteria to their financial analysis and SRI analysts
framed ESG criteria according to asset managers’ financial constraints. Both managers and analysts
worked on how to set decision matrix ratios that respected the risk diversification policy suggested by
portfolio theory. The fact that the asset manager was used to referring to qualitative criteria in his
investment decision process clearly facilitated this alignment of understandings and interests, together with
the fact that ESG criteria had first been framed for equity investment (as evidenced by the sector-based
approach).

The decision matrix design also contributed to the generation of new knowledge about companies,
on how to select companies, and on how to sell that company selection to clients. This generation of new
knowledge led the asset manager to perceive SRI as an enhancement to investment activity and its
associated logic. A new approach emerged because asset managers and SRI analysts did not perceive their
existing calculative devices as fixed and constant, but instead as incomplete and open-ended (Nicolini,
Mengis, & Swan, 2012). They believed that improvement was possible. In particular, both asset managers
and SRI analysts were intrigued by the fact that they could not explain why some companies with very bad
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SRI grades performed well financially, and vice versa. The search for understanding prompted
cooperation and created mutual dependencies.

Two factors facilitated the emergent and expansive nature of these instruments: the future
orientation of calculative devices and their somewhat lower relative importance than human agency in the
investment decision process. The SRI analysts and the asset manager believed the redesign project was
worthwhile because they thought better financial performance could be generated in the long-term as a
result of including ESG criteria (it also resulted from the relationships between equity investment and the
real economy). Moreover, though constrained by their calculative devices when investing — and especially
by the risk ratios suggested by portfolio theory — the equity asset manages was independent enough of
those devices to consider changing them and trusting more in his own knowledge, experience, and
intuition.

In contrast, fixed-income investment relies heavily on quantitative calculative devices. Ideally,
econometric models would act as a substitute for human agency, making the investment process as
rational as possible. There was understandably strong resistance to any intervention that might threaten
this scientific basis; the introduction of qualitative ESG criteria, which appear less objective and reliable
than financial criteria, was not positively received. Because the fixed-income group believed that the
existing models could not be improved upon, this hindered the generation of new knowledge. The
situation might have been different if a systematic relationship had been identified between ESG criteria
and the probability of an issuer going bankrupt, but this was not possible. Consequently, despite the
financial crisis and the potential knowledge that could be generated by exploring this relationship, the
existing calculative devices in fixed-income investment remained largely uncontested. This shows that one
way of sustaining an institutional logic is by cementing the unquestioned status of its associated
instruments.

Another factor was that those calculative devices were very difficult to unpack. Despite repeated
requests, the SRI analyst and project manager failed to obtain detailed information about the models used
by the fixed-income manager, who said it was all too technical for analysts and project managers with little
financial background. So the fixed-income manager’s calculative devices remained black boxes. This
obviously did not facilitate collaboration between the asset management and SRI departments. The SRI
analysts found it almost impossible to integrate qualitative and sector-based criteria into what seemed to
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them to be impenetrable, inflexible econometric models. The rigid nature of calculative devices therefore
also resulted from the perceived inaccessibility of the calculative devices. Both dimensions contribute to
explaining why ESG criteria remained an ex-post constraint that did not help asset managers select issuers
and why calculative devices could not be merged.

The differences between how calculative devices were transformed in equity compared to fixedincome investment have ontological implications. In equity investment, the fusion of financial and SRI
calculative devices enabled the alignment of the two ontologies associated with each type of calculative
devices. Because instruments provide the evaluation through which reality is valued, SRI has become
valuable in financial terms. The new calculative devices in use came to be shaped by both financial and
SRI values and shaped practices and the financial logic accordingly. In other words, they were mediating
instruments. In fixed-income investment, both ontologies (i.e., finance and SRI) remained separate as a
consequence of the separation between calculative devices. The lack of transformation of the financial
calculative devices used in fixed-income investment prevented asset managers from perceiving economic
reality in a different way and SRI was perceived to be valueless in financial terms. As MacKenzie explained
(2011, p. 1783), different evaluation practices sustain different “presuppositions about the nature and
properties of the features and processes of the economic world”. The creation of the new calculative
devices in fixed-income investment did not enable the commensurability of SRI and financial values and
evaluations: they did not trigger ontological change.

The above findings suggest that some features of calculative devices facilitate their roles as channels
for the transformation of practices and its associated logic, providing some conditions under which this
co-transformation is possible. This relationship is summarized in Figure 8. However, the identification of
these two conditions does not mean that other factors, such as the unwillingness of fixed-income asset
managers to collaborate with SRI analysts and the type of cluster of evaluation practices, did not play a
role. As shown above, these elements are bound into a recursive relationship. For instance, the view of the
fixed-income investment’s calculative devices as impenetrable black boxes also resulted from the
conviction of actors that they could not be transformed. That is why it is very important to understand
that it is above all the belief on the part of actors that ESG criteria were impossible to incorporate into the
econometric models of fixed-income investment processes that led to the lack of integration of SRI into
the financial logic. There could conceivably have been a different outcome if the fixed-income manager
had believed in the ability of SRI analysts to help forecast debt problems. This shows that instruments
acquire their performative nature rather than it being somehow inherent. It is the relationships among
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instruments, practices, and institutional logics that determine whether those instruments will have
performative effects and if they do, of what kind they will be. 11

-----------------------------------Insert Figure 8 about here
------------------------------------

11

Obviously, drawing firm conclusions based on one case study is difficult, especially since the asset management
industry relies heavily on calculative devices, which explains their central role in this article. The model proposed by
the article is therefore a proposition that would require further testing.
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Conclusion

This article sought to show that the fashioning of new calculative devices is an essential process through
which practices change, and thereby potentially change an institutional logic. However, the nature of the
calculative devices, the identities of actors, the organizational practices, and the institutional logic all
depend on one another. The fashioning of new calculative devices enabled the integration of SRI in equity
investment in a way it did not in fixed-income investment. This was due primarily to the different ways in
which the actors understood the instruments and their relationships to the financial logic. Introducing a
new calculative device does not tell us enough about the way it will be shaped and shape practices and the
institutional logic. This work suggests potentially productive intersections between accounting and
institutional literatures. Institutional theorists need to take accounting seriously both as a site in which to
observe institutional change and as a medium through which it is effected. Reciprocally, accounting
theorists can develop better accounts of the productivity of these instruments by specifying the way in
which they articulate with changes in practices and as media for the transformation of institutional logics.
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APPENDIX A
WHAT IS AN SRI FUND?

An SRI (Socially Responsible Investment) fund is an entity that collects money from investors
(institutional or individual) in order to invest it in transferable securities (shares, bonds, etc.). Every fund
must obtain clearance from the financial authorities. To receive clearance, funds must comply with several
financial and risk ratios known as the “fund profile,” and disclose this information. An asset manager runs
each fund and decides where and when to invest money according to the fund’s “investment process” (see
below). An investor deciding to invest in an SRI fund is often interested in several criteria, summarized as
follows:
−

Assets under management: the total must be at least ten times greater than the assets in which the
client wants to invest.

−

Financial performance: the fund must “beat the market,” which means that its financial
performance must exceed the benchmark index and competing fund performances.

−

Management fees: the asset management company’s fees must be as low as possible.

−

Investment processes: these must convince clients of the asset management company’s ability to
achieve better financial performance. They must also demonstrate that the most socially
responsible companies are selected for the portfolio. This means the asset management company
must provide evidence of its unique expertise by offering sophisticated investment processes,
selecting companies through the complex use of calculative devices such as financial models and
ESG criteria. Often, the investment process of an SRI fund follows a three-stage approach: 1)
financial and SRI analysis; 2) definition of an “investment universe” which comprises all
companies in which asset managers can invest; and 3) application of decision criteria by asset
managers to select companies from this investment universe.
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APPENDIX B
PARTICIPATIVE OBSERVATION AT THE INDUSTRY LEVEL

12

Organization

Events

Date

1

Broker C

SRI Road Show

18/01/07

2

Think-Tank A

Working Group on CSR

3

Think-Tank A

Working Group on CSR Corporate Governance Code

20/01/07

4

Social Rating Agency

2006 Annual Meetings / Conference

22/02/07

5

Employers Lobby A

Meeting for CSR Corporate Governance Code

28/02/07

6

Employers Lobby B

Meeting for CSR Corporate Governance Code

05/03/07

7

Think-Tank A

Governance and financial communication (Conference)

14/03/07

8

Think-Tank A

Working Group on CSR Corporate Governance Code

20/03/07

9

Think-Tank B

Working Group on SRI

28/03/07

10

Think-Tank C

Working Group on Shareholder activism

13/04/07

11

Think-Tank A

Working Group on CSR Corporate Governance Code

24/04/07

12

European Commission

Meeting for CSR Corporate Governance Code

07/05/07

13

Think-Tank B

Working Group on SRI

04/05/07

14

Bank A

Annual Meeting

14/05/07

15

Think-Tank A

Working Group on CSR Corporate Governance Code

22/05/07

16

Consulting Firm C

Implementing CSR in the companies (Conference)

12/06/07

17

French SRI Lobby

Annual Conference

12/06/07

18

Think-Tank A

Governance in listed companies (Conference)

25/06/07

19

Think-Tank B

SRI and Retail (Conference)

27/06/07

20

Think-Tank C

Working group on CSR

05/07/07

21

Think-Tank C

Working group on CSR

10/07/07

22

Think-Tank C

Working group on CSR

12/07/07

Corporate Social Responsibility
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12

Corporate Governance Code

23/01/07

Organization

Events

Date

23

Think-Tank D

Working group on CSR

20/07/07

24

Think-Tank D

Working group on CSR

06/09/07

25

Think-Tank C

Working group on CSR

20/09/07

26

Think-Tank A

CSR in the CAC 40 Boards (Conference)

03/10/07

27

Broker B

SRI Road Show

30/10/07

28

Social Rating Agency E

Meeting

05/11/07

29

Invitation to tender A

Meeting

13/11/07

30

Social Rating Agency F

Meeting

16/11/07

31

Social Rating Agency G

Meeting

22/11/07

32

Think-Tank C

Working group on CSR

04/12/07

33

Think-Tank B

Working Group on SRI

06/12/07

34

Think-Tank C

Working Group on SRI

06/12/07

35

Think-Tank C

SRI in Fixed-Income Management (Conference)

20/12/07

36

Invitation to tender B

Meeting

11/01/08

37

Social Rating Agency A

Meeting

15/01/08

38

Think-Tank B

SRI (Conference)

30/01/08

39

Think-Tank B

Working Group on SRI

21/02/08

40

Think-Tank C

CSR (Conference)

02/04/08

41

Broker B

SRI Road Show

08/04/08

42

Consulting Firm D

CSR Road Show

10/04/08

43

NGO B

Meeting

15/04/08

44

European SRI Lobby

Working group on SRI

17/04/08

45

Invitation to tender C

Meeting

06/05/08

46

European SRI Lobby

Working group on SRI

13/05/08

47

European Mutual Insurance Lobby

Working group on SRI

16/05/08

48

Invitation to tender D

Meeting

19/05/08

49

Bank E

Annual Meeting

22/05/08

50

Bank A

Annual Meeting

27/05/08

51

Consulting Firm E

SRI Conference

03/06/08
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Organization

Events

Date

52

Think-Tank B

Working group on SRI

16/06/08

53

Asset Management Company C

SRI Funds of funds (Conference)

17/06/08

54

Broker A

SRI Road Show

18/06/08

55

Consulting Firm F

SRI Analysis Products Presentation

19/06/08

56

Social Rating Agency B

Meeting

26/06/08

57

Asset Management Company E

Meeting

02/07/08

58

Social Rating Agency B

Meeting

03/07/08

59

Social Rating Agency A

Meeting

08/07/08

60

Invitation to tender E

Meeting

11/07/08

61

Think-Tank E

Working group on SRI

22/07/08

62

Proxy (Manifest)

Business Meeting

05/02/09

63

Conference

CSR

06/02/09

64

Conference

SRI & Institutional Investors

12/02/09

65

Meeting/Business Development

Asset management company A

05/03/09

66

Conference

Greenwashing

10/03/09

67

Meeting/Business Development

Asset management company B

24/03/09
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APPENDIX C
INTERVIEWS

Organization

Function

Date

Time

Recorded

Asset Management Companies

1

Asset Management Company A

Head of SRI

13/10/06

1h00

No

2

Asset Management Company B

Head of SRI

13/11/07

1h13

Yes

3

Asset Management Company C

Head of SRI

01/08/07

1h15

Yes

4

Asset Management Company D

CEO

06/09/08

1h10

Yes

5

Asset Management Company D

SRI Analyst

06/09/08

1h10

Yes

6

Asset Management Company E

Head of European Fund
Distribution & CEO France

05/02/09

1h00

Yes

7

Asset Management Company D

Equities Manager

09/03/09

1h28

Yes

8

Asset Management Company D

Fixed-Income Manager

09/03/09

0h44

Yes

9

Asset Management Company D

Head
of
Development

13/03/09

1h45

Yes

10

Asset Management Company D

CEO

13/03/09

1h55

Yes

11

Asset Management Company D

SRI Analyst

16/03/09

1h31

Yes

12

Asset Management Company D

SRI
Management

19/03/09

0h59

Yes

13

Asset Management Company D

Executive

19/03/09

0h30

Yes

14

Asset Management Company D

SRI Analyst

19/03/09

1h05

Yes

SRI

&

Development

CSR Departments

15

Bank A

Head of Corporate CSR

09/08/07

1h02

Yes

16

Bank B

Project Manager

28/02/08

1h27

Yes

17

Insurance Company C

CSR Group
Manager (2)

/

Project

19/02/08

1h22

Yes

18

Insurance Company C

CSR

/

Project

09/06/08

1h05

Yes

France
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Function

Date

Time

Recorded

Manager
19

Insurance Company D

Head of Corporate CSR

26/10/07

2h00

Yes

20

Insurance Company D

Project Manager

11/03/08

1h52

Yes

21

Other company A

Project
Group

Manager

/

CSR

26/11/07

0h58

Yes

22

Other company B

Project
Group

Manager

/

CSR

27/10/09

1h15

No

CSR Managers within Business Units

23

Insurance Company C / Purchase Dpt.

Project Manager (2)

13/08/07

2h30

Yes

24

Insurance Company C / Purchase Dpt.

Project Manager

20/02/08

2h15

Yes

25

Utility B / Purchase Dpt.

Project Manager

28/02/08

1h02

Yes

Brokers with SRI Departments

26

Broker A

Head of SRI Research

21/11/07

1h13

Yes

27

Broker B

Head of SRI Research

23/02/09

1h05

No

28

Broker B

Head of SRI Research & SRI
Analyst

30/11/09

2h00

No

SRI Trade Unions” label

29

CIES Trade Union A

Member

08/08/07

0h55

Yes

30

CIES Trade Union B

Member

16/07/07

2h06

Yes

31

CIES Trade Union A, B & C

Members (3)

11/01/10

2h00

No

Consultants specialized in CSR/SRI

32

Consulting Firm A

Senior Consultant

09/07/07

1h30

No

33

Consulting Firm B

Partner

05/03/08

1h00

Yes

34

Consulting Firm C

Senior Consultant

07/11/07

1h30

No

47

35

Organization

Function

Date

Time

Recorded

Consulting Firm D

Consultant

25/02/08

1h00

No

French Asset Management Professional Association

36

French Association of Management

Head of Research

22/10/07

2h15

No

37

French Association of Management

Chief Executive Officer

23/07/07

1h35

Yes

NGO

38

NGO A specialized in SRI

Head of SRI Research

30/10/08

0h50

Yes

39

NGO B specialized in Finance

Project Manager

06/03/08

2h03

Yes

Head of Equity and SRI

29/10/08

1h07

Yes

Pension Funds

40

Pension Fund A

Social Rating Agencies

41

Social Rating Agency A

Head of Research

12/12/07

1h22

Yes

42

Social Rating Agency B

Head of Research

19/09/08

1h00

Yes

43

Social Rating Agency C

Head of Research

02/08/07

0h45

Yes

44

Social Rating Agency D

Head of Research

09/08/07

1h05

Yes

45

Social Rating Agency E

Senior Client Relationship
Manager

26/09/08

1h52

Yes

17/07/07

1h29

Yes

25/02/09

1h05

Yes

Others

46

Think Tank B specialized in SRI

Project Manager

47

Development French Agency

Consultant
Headquarters

48

for

the

49

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Ideal Type of Financial Logic in the Asset Management Industry
(Adapted from Laurel, 2013 based on Thornton, 2002; Thornton et al., 2012)

Financial Logic
Economic System

-

Market Capitalism

Mission

-

Clear mission of profit maximization by optimizing risk and return

-

Guided by strong economic theories such as portfolio theory and
yield curve

Sources of Identity

-

Asset Management as profit-maximizing business

Basis of Norms

-

Self-interest

Basis of Attention

-

Status gained from profit maximization

Basis of Strategy

-

Increase financial profit

Sources of Legitimacy

-

Net Asset Value and financial return over a benchmark

Sources of Authority &
Authority Structures

-

Shareholder (client) activism

-

Fiduciary duty

Governance

-

Highly regulated

-

Strong governance structures in place (e.g. Management fees;
reporting and disclosure standards)

-

Sophisticated tools and models

-

Reporting and disclosure standards

Tools and Models
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Figure 1: SRI Invest’s Organizational Chart
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Director of
Support
Functions

Multi-funds

Support
Functions

Figure 2: Decision Matrix (source: SRI Invest)
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Company underrepresented in the portfolio
d
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Poor

Laggards

Figure 3: Equity Investment Process (source: SRI Invest)
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Figure 4: Fixed-Income Funds’ SRI Constraint (source: SRI Invest)

Figure 5 – Example of yield curve 13

13 The yield curve exhibits the relationship between interest rates and time. Used as a benchmark for debt in the
market, the shape of the yield curve gives an idea of the future interest rate direction.
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Figure 6 : Example of corporates’ SRI ranking used in both equity and fixed-income investment (source : SRI Invest)
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Figure 7 – Example of company fact sheets used in both equity and fixed-income investment (source : SRI Invest) 14

14

The analyst’s name is a pseudonym.
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Figure 8 : The mediating role of instruments in the transformation of a logic and its associated
practices
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